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Leading counter-arguthat higher prices result from these contracts.
ments will be that this method is the only effective way to protect the
good will of the manufacturer,3 6 that the dealer takes the goods with
the contract attached,3 7 and that the prices on non-fair-traded goods
have risen more sharply than those on fair-traded commodities.3 8
Future litigation and legislative controversy over resale price maintenance appear to be a certainty. Whether "fair trade" be economically
wise or unwise, the trend shows that it is in for some minute examination by the courts and legislative bodies.
KIRBY SULLIVAN.

Trial Practice-Prosecutor's Comments-Arguing Possibility of
Parole or Pardon as Reason for Withholding Recommendation
for Life Imprisonment
"Gentlemen, . . . With our system in Georgia, a man is entitled to
parole or pardon after seven years, and when his application is put in
all the judges or interested parties are usually out of office and no one
recalls the facts in the crime. If this jury sentenced this defendant to
life imprisonment and he should be given his release on parole in seven
"XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75; XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 85;
Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62 SALES
MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1, 1949). Other arguments of those opposed to "fair trade' are:
(1) As the "fair trade" fields become more crowded there will tend to be an
elimination of the small retailer since the old-timers will try to restrict the number
of new dealers. XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75, 76. This is claimed to have
already happened to some extent in England. XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70,
166.
(2) The manufacturer can adequately protect his good will by refusing to sell
to those who refuse to comply with a resale price agreement. Liquor Store, Inc.
v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 388 (Fla. 1949).

(3) Chain stores reap unnecessarily juicy profits by reason of less expense in

marketing "fair-traded" goods, and they often sell similar products under their
own brand or trade name at cheaper prices. XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75;

TNEC

INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcONOMIC POWER, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 232, 234-5 (1941).
" Newcomb, In Defense of Fair Trade, 13 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 84, 85

(Juy 1948).

" Callman, "Fair Trade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. oF PiTT. L. REY. 443, 462

(1949).
" Griffiths, Further Comments on) Fair Trade, 13
(July 1948).

JOURNAL OF MARKETING

85

Other arguments urged in support of "fair trade" are:
(1) The "fair trade" system has been of tremendous benefit to a number of

industries. Behoteguy, Resale Price Maintenance in the Tire Industry, 13 JOURNAL
OF MARKETING 315, 319 (Jan. 1949).

(2) "Fair trade" protects the consumer from deceptive price-cutting tactics.
AMERICAN FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, INC., A PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO FAIR TRADE LAWS

34 (1948).
(3) "Fair trade" is no barrier to competition between rival articles. Callman,
"FairTrade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 443, 452 (1949).
(4) In those states allowing fixed prices, the manufacturer may hold down
prices.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

years, you would be turning him loose upon society after a few years
imprisonment." Such was the argument of counsel for the state in
Bryan v. State.' The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree and withheld a recommendation of mercy. The death sentence automatically followed. In affirming the judgment, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the refusal of the trial court to declare a
mistrial was not error under the rulings in McLendon v. State.2 One
judge dissented. Two concurred specially "for the reason only that
this Court is bound by former full-bench decisions." 3
The full-bench decisions referred to begin with Lucas v. State,4
where such an argument was held not improper since the recommendation of mercy was within the discretion of the jury and had nothing
5
to do with the guilt of the accused. Subsequent unanimous decisions,
6
interspersed with "majority-dissent" cases and one which affirms a
verdict by an equally divided court,7 condemn the argument as tending
to prejudice the jury against the accused but hold that corrective measures on the part of the trial court will prevent the necessity of declaring
a mistrial."
The propriety of such comments on the part of prosecuting attorneys
has been most frequently considered in the state of Kentucky. The
practice has been repeatedly disapproved and, under special circumstances, has contributed to reversals. 9 However, the Kentucky court
has consistently refused to reverse on this point alone,10 having affirmed
1206 Ga. 73, 55 S. E. 2d 574 (1949).
2205 Ga. 55, 52 S. E. 2d 294 (1949).
wrote the opinion in McLendon
2 One of these concurring judges (Wyatt, J.)
v. State, supra note 2, wherein he expressed the same personal dissatisfaction,
saying that such argument was improper and should result in a mistrial unless the
trial court (1) acted promptly to prevent it and (2) instructed the jury to disregard. "Full-bench," as here used, seems to indicate unanimity of opinion as well
as perfection of attendance.
'146 Ga. 315, 91 S. E. 72 (1916).
Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S. E. 2d 849 (1945) ; Thornton v. State, 190
Ga. 783, 10 S. E. 2d 746 (1940) ; Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 155 S. E. 11
(1930).
' Sloan v. State, 183 Ga. 108, 187 S. E. 670 (1936) ; White v. State, 177 Ga.
115 t 169 S. E. 499 (1933).
Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S. E. 201 (1930).
S From its continued use, it is apparent that Georgia prosecutors believe the
argument to be effective notwithstanding instructions to the jury to disregard. On
the other hand, the repeated expressions of dissatisfaction emanating from the
Georgia court apparently encourage defense counsel to argue the point on appeal
in the hope that the court will eventually reverse itself.
0 Crawford v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 498, 95 S. W. 2d 12 (1936) (youthful
defendant convicted on questionable evidence) ; Berry v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky.
528, 13 S. W. 2d 521 (1929) (abundant evidence of insanity) ; Estepp v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 156, 214 S. W. 891 (1919) (other errors). The Berry case was
expressly overruled in Powell v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S. W. 2d 279
(1938).
"oBass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S. W. 2d 386 (1944) ; Powell v.
Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S. W. 2d 279 (1938) ; Underwood v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 613, 99 S. W. 2d 467 (1936) ; Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15,
89 S. W. 2d 316 (1935) ; Lotheridge v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 500, 86 S. W. 2d
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judgments imposing the death penalty where objections to such remarks
were overruled by the trial court." This court has at times marvelled
that prosecutors continue to use the argument in the face of its disapproval, 12 but has since seemed content to hold it not prejudicial to
the "substantial rights of the accused."' 3
What are the substantial rights of the accused, and have they been
prejudiced? In most jurisdictions where the jury has power to reduce
the penalty in capital cases by recommendation, it is discretionary ;14
and a few of these courts hold that the jury may properly consider the
effect of a possible pardon or parole in determining whether to qualify
their verdict.' 5 Theoretically, at least, the measure of punishment becomes important only after the guilt of the accused has been ascertained.
It may then be argued that, being guilty of a capital offense, the criminal
can demand, as a matter of right, nothing more than that his execution
proceed according to law. On the other hand, whether guilty or innocent, the accused has a right of trial by an impartial jury,' 0 and the
278 (1935) ; Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S. W. 2d 817 (1935) ; Glenday
v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 313, 74 S. W. 2d 332 (1934); Holmes v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 573, 44 S.W. 2d 592 (1931) ; Miller v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky.
448, 33 S. W. 2d 590 (1930) ; Moore v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 128, 3 S. W. 2d
190 (1928); Hall v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 718 270 S. W. 5 (1925); Bolin v.
Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 608, 268 S. W. 306 (1925).
"Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15, 89 S. W. 2d 316 (1935) ; Moore v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 128, 3 S.W. 2d 190 (1928).
1 "We are loath to believe that such action on their [the prosecutors'] part is
encouraged because these arguments, although condemned, have under the particular facts in the cases involved been held by us not so prejudicial as to warrant
a reversal." Seymour v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 348, 354, 295 S. W. 142, 145
(1927). Again in Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15, 19, 89 S.W. 2d 316, 317
(1935) : "Time after time we have condemned the use of such arguments by attorneys for the commonwealth, and why they will persist in the use of it we cannot
understand;
but in only one case have we reversed a judgment on that account...."
3
Bass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S.W. 2d 386 (1944) ; cf. Long v.
Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 83, 155 S.W. 2d 246 (1941).
"Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 303 (1899) (federal statute). "They
may do so with or without a reason, and they may decline to do so with or without
a reason. They may do so as a matter of public policy, or out of mere sympathy
for the prisoner, or they may decline to do so for reasons of public policy, or on
account of absence of sympathy for the accused." Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315,
326, 91 S.E. 72, 77 (1916). From the absolute discretion here depicted by the
Georgia court, the power of the jury runs through varying degrees of restriction
depending on the offense and the jurisdiction. An extensive treatment of this
point may be found in 17 A. L. R. 1117 (1922) and Supplements, 87 A. L. R. 1362
(1933) ; 138 A. L. R. 1230 (1942).
" Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P. 2d 312 (1936) ; House v. State, 192
Ark. 476, 92 S.W. 2d 868 (1936) ; Watts v. State, 82 N. E. 2d 846 (Ind. 1948) ;
Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532, 175 N. E. 219 (1930) ; State v. Carroll, 52
Wyo. 29, 69 P. 2d 542 (1937). See Notes, 51 HARV.L. Ray. 353 (1937) ; 90 U.
PA. L. REv. 221 (1941). One court adheres to this view under a statute providing
for a recommendation by the jury ". . . upon and after the consideration of all the
evidence." N. J.STAT. ANN. §2:138-4 (1939), State v. Molnar, 133 N. 3. L. 327,
44 A. 2d 197 (1945). The quoted provision was added by Pub. Laws 1919, c. 134,
§1 after the court had construed the power of recommendation to be within the
unlimited discretion of the jury. State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L. 436, 106 Atl. 385
(1919).
0
" Compare U. S. Co-xsT. A-ENnD. VI ("impartial jury"), with N. C. CONST.
Art. I, §13 ("good and lawful men").
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legislative delegation of the power to reduce the penalty to that same
body would seem to evince an intent that the power be exercised with
impartiality. Equality under the law is not to be attained by permitting
the prosecuting attorney to prevail upon the jury to forego what may be
an otherwise satisfactory course of action in order to preclude the future application of that which he considers bad parole law administered
by irresponsible officials.17 Here, under the cloak of "due process," is
something savoring of mob rule.
At any rate, the great majority of courts denounce the argument as
improper in that it interferes with the discretion of the jury'8 or presents a possibility of prejudice, 19 or because the granting or withholding
of pardons and paroles is not a jury function. 20 Yet, no case has been
found in which the mere injection of the argument, without aggravating
circumstances, has been held so prejudicial as to require a reversal of
a judgment imposing the death penalty. The usual test for prejudice
has been its positive appearance 2l and, since the penalty imposed is discretionary, only the evidence supporting that portion of the verdict determining the defendant's guilt is considered reviewable. 22
1" "If prosecuting officers have any complaint to make because of the exercise
of certain powers that are conferred by law upon another tribunal, they should
make such complaints at a proper time and place, and not seek to influence a jury
to do something to prevent such other tribunal from passing judgment upon the
case upon its merits, when it is actually brought before it. Neither the prosecutor
nor the jury are or can be held responsible for the acts of the 'power' whose duty
it may become to pass upon the question whether a sentence shall be commuted
or not." State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 431, 126 Pac. 286, 293 (1912).
1' "No self-respecting judge would permit a prosecuting officer to lecture him
as to his right to fix the punishment within lawful limits, and in the present instance the trial judge should have interposed to protect the jury and the defendant
from the attorney's assumption of privileges the law gives to the jury alone."
Jacobs v. State, 103 Miss. 622, 627, 60 So. 723, 724 (1913).
1' Peterson v. State, 231 Ala. 625, 166 So. 20 (1936) ; People v. Caetano, 29
Cal. 2d 616, 177 P. 2d 1 (1947); Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S. E. 2d 849
(1945) ; People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916) ; State v. Junkins,
147 Iowa 588, 126 N. W. 689 (1910); Crawford v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 498,
95 S. W. 2d 12 (1936) ; State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940) ; Augustine v. State, 201 Miss. 277, 28 So. 2d 243 (1946) ; Tapedo v. State; 34 Okla. Crim.
App. 165, 245 Pac. 897 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 21 A. 2d
38 (1941) ; Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S. E. 414 (1929) ; State
v. Knapp, 194 Wash. 286, 77 P. 2d 985 (1938).
"Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Farrell v. People,
133 Ill. 244, 24 N. E. 423 (1890) ; Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. Rep. 311, 129
S. W. 2d 667 (1939) ; State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 Pac. 286 (1912).
21 As explained by the Kentucky court, ". . . whether the error thereby committed [by the argument] would be sufficiently prejudicial in all cases to authorize
a reversal of a conviction would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of
the case; i.e., whether the error in the light of the proven facts was calculated to
produce such a prejudicial effect on the verdict of the jury as to entitle the convicted defendant to a new trial, or whether, under the facts, the argument, though
improper, could not possibly produce such a prejudicial effect and was therefore
immaterial." Tiernay v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 201, 204, 43 S. W. 2d 661, 663
(1931).
""But see Dent, J., dissenting in State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va. 1, 12, 20 S. E.
873, 877 (1894): "Granting that the prisoner was guilty of murder in the first
degree,... the law, in tender consideration of human frailties, seeks to distinguish
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Prior to 1941, a conviction of any of the four capital crimes 28 in
North Carolina carried the mandatory death penalty and a recommenda24
tion of mercy contained in a jury's verdict was treated as surplusage.
In that year the jury was authorized to reduce the penalty for burglary
and arson to life imprisonment by appending a recommenation to their
verdict,2 5 but the question here under discussion seems not to have
arisen. In March, 1949, however, all four sections were rewritten to
permit such a recommendation, apparently to be discretionary, 20 The
pertinent North Carolina parole statute27 provides that all prisoners
serving a life sentence shall become entitled to a hearing on an application for parole after a minimum service of ten years.
Under this state of the law, it would seem but a matter of time until
the propriety of arguing parole law in urging the jury to withhold a
recommendation of mercy comes before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. This Court has previously decided, in cases not involving
the jury's power to recommend mercy, that reference to the right of
appeal or the possibility of executive clemency if the defendant should
be convicted constitutes reversible error. 28 These cases may indicate
that the similar practice here considered will likewise be condemned.
But the similarity is deceiving. Whereas the one assumes a verdict and
attempts to prevent a discretionary qualification, the other seeks to influence the jury in arriving at the verdict itself. 29
between the different degrees of depravity entering into each particular commission of the highest of crimes ....
The intemperate and unjustifiable language
used by the prosecutor was to inflame the minds of the jury, and prevent this
discrimination on their part. He accomplished his purpose [the death penalty],
which is the best evidence possible that the prisoner was prejudiced by his conduct."
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4200 (first degree murder), §4204 (rape),
§4233
(first degree burglary), §4238 (arson).
2
25,State v. Day, 215 N. C. 566, 2 S. E. 2d 569 (1939).
N. C. Pub. L. 1941, c. 215, §§ 1, 2.
2" . . shall suffer death, provided, if the jury, at the time of rendering the
verdict in open court, shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment
for life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury." N. C. Sess.
L. 1949, c. 299, §§1-4; 27 N. C. L. REv. 449 (1949). N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-20
(1943) (killing adversary in a duel) and id. §14-278 (malicious train-wrecking
resulting in a homicide) which also impose the death penalty were not mentioned.
The question arises whether they must also be deemed amended since their validity
under N. C. CoNsT. Art. XI, §2, which restricts the death penalty to the four
named crimes, depends upon their being treated as statutory specifications of situations constituting first degree murder wherein deliberation and premeditation are
conclusively
presumed.
7
N. C. GEN.
STAT. §148-58 (1943).
28 State v. Hawley, 229 N. C. 167, 48 S. E. 2d 35 (1948) ; State v. Little, 228
N. C. 417, 45 S. E. 2d 542 (1947).
9 Care should be exercised to distinguish between the two separate purposes,
depending on the situation at trial, which may be subserved by informing the jury
of possible leniency to be extended the prisoner by some other agency of government:
(1) Where there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the possibilities of executive clemency or appellate reversal for error may be advanced as
an invitation to the jury to assume the psychological position of a small cog in
the machinery of justice and thus shed the responsibility for their verdict. E.g.,
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It is believed, however, that in order to avoid the dilemma existing
in Georgia and Kentucky, a definite stand should be taken either for or
against the use of the argument.30 Of these two positions, it is submitted that the injection of this line of argument into the proceedings of
a capital case should be held to result in a mistrial since (1) it cannot
be said with certainty that the impression thereby created can be erased
from the minds of the jurors, (2) the parole statutes pertain to a disGoff v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 428, 44 S. W. 2d 306 (1931) ; State v. Little, supra
note 28; Commonwealth v. Balles, 160 Pa. Super. 148, 50 A. 2d 729 (1946). As
this tends directly to alter the weight of evidence necessary to a conviction, it is
generally held highly prejudicial and doubt has been expressed whether its evil
effect can be eradicated by action of the trial court. See State v. Hawley, mipra
note 28.
(2) Where the guilt of the accused is all but conceded and the statute permits
the jury to assess the punishment, this becoming the principal issue involved, the
jury may be asked to avoid the effect of a future pardon or parole. The argument
seeks to impose upon the jury the responsibility for the inadequate punishment
and prospective crimes of the defendant by depicting the paroling authority as
irresponsible or the existing penal law as a farce. See, e.g. Bolin v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 608, 268 S. W. 306 (1925) ("weak-kneed governors and parole
commissioners"); Cobb v. State, 251 Ala. 505, 38 So. 2d 279 (1949) ("rotten"
penal system). Here, the prejudice, if any, is not so apparent, for assuming that
the jury has acted directly upon the suggestion, it remains to be determined whether
any rights of the accused have been violated.
Tacit recognition of this distinction may be implied from State v. Howard, 222
N. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d 917 (1942) where, after a review of the cases involving
parole arguments designed to prevent a recommendation of mercy, the court decided that a prosecutor's reference to paroles was not so prejudicial as to warrant
a reversal of a conviction of embezzlement.
30 Due to local variations in the wording of the statutes, the vigilance of the
trial judges, the respect accorded to and the degree of control exercised by the
appellate courts, the results of any holding cannot be conclusively predicted for
any given jurisdiction. But with the situations in Georgia and Kentucky, compare
those in the following states where the question is apparently settled:
(1) Arizona: Argument held proper in Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P.
2d 312 (1936). The only subsequent case found involving the point followed the
former without comment. State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1942).
(2) Arkansas: Argument held not improper in House v. State, 192 Ark. 476,
92 S.W. 2d 868 (1936).
(3) Illinois: Overruling of objection to similar argument held reversible error
in Farrell v. People, 133 Ill. 244, 24 N. E. 423 (1890). The only subsequent case
found is People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916) wherein the overruling of an objection was held error but in as much as the argument was directed
toward two defendants, one of whom received a sentence of 99 years, the court
saw no apparent effect on the verdict.
(4) Louisiana: Overruling of objection to the argument held reversible error
in State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922) and where objection was
sustained, the argument itself contributed to a reversal in State v. Henry, 196 La.
217, 198 So. 910 (1940). The only other cases found are State v. Edwards, 155
La. 305, 99 So. 229 (1923) in which the argument appeared ineffective in that the
death penalty was not imposed, and State v. Burks, 196 La. 374, 199 So. 220 (1940)
where the effect of the argument was held eradicated by the trial court's instructions.
(5) Ohio: Instructions by court on pardon and parole held proper. Liska v.
State, 115 Ohio St. 283, 152 N. E. 667 (1926) ; Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532,
175 N. E. 219 (1930).
(6) Virginia: Overruling of objection to the argument contributed to a reversal. Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S. E. 414 (1929).
(7) West Virginia: Argument held not improper. State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va.
1, 20 S. E. 873 (1894).
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tinct phase of our penal and correctional system with which the jury,
as such, has no concern, 3 1 and (3) to supply the deficiencies in existing
penal law is not the responsibility of the jury in the individual case.82
If, on the other hand, it be decided that matters of policy should be
left to the individual jury, such should be placed squarely before them
in the unbiased instructions of the trial judge rather than by an impassioned plea of the prosecuting attorney.
WILLIS C. BUMGARNER.
"Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
" See note 17 supra.

